WEBINAR 3: AMERICAS - The Consequences of the Change of Political Positioning of the Brazilian Government on Facing the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Breakdown of Democracy
Tatiana CARDOSO SQUEFF & Lúcia SOUZA D’AQUINO
16 November 2020
In 2016, Brazil saw significant changes in its government that indicated a change in its political positioning. Beginning in March, with the start of the impeachment process against former President Dilma Rousseff, which culminated in the rise of Michel Temer as head of the executive branch, several measures demonstrated these shifts. Among them is Constitutional Amendment (CA) no. 95, also called “CA of the expenditure ceiling”, which modified the Brazilian Constitution to change the way in which government funds are transferred to several areas, such as health and education.
Even if it had a very relevant objective, in the Brazilian context, of avoiding the further growth of public debt in relation to the national GDP, this CA limits public expenditures and investments to the same amounts spent by the Federal Government in the previous year, adjusting only for inflation. Thus, primary expenditures, in areas such as health, social programs and education, will not be readjusted until 2036, while other expenditures such as the payment of public debt and electoral expenses, among others, are not covered by it.
As a result, the aforementioned CA ended up preventing an increase in spending in strategic primary areas, hampering the public budget. It thereby weakens and disrupts essential investment in the ongoing development of social policies perceived as essential for the reduction of regional and social inequalities in Brazil in accordance to with what was predicted in the constitutional project inaugurated in 1988, with the approval of the current Constitution. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, these actions taken by the Brazilian government are deliberate retrogressive measures since they will not only limit the transfer and public investments in essential areas for the fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights, but will also impact the poorest in society.
This way, it can be said that both the removal of President Rousseff and the approval of CA no. 95 are evidence of democratic decline since both actions have affected the most vulnerable members of society by forcing them back into an “invisibility mode” that previous governments had been working against – and succeeding. Before these maneuvers, Brazil had achieved a significant reduction in hunger, just as it had reduced poverty by over 60% and extreme poverty by over 75%. Higher education was expanded by over 60%, with access to disadvantaged groups also expanded. Investments in the Public Health Care System (called SUS, in the Portuguese acronym) were at the highest levels seen since Brazil's transition to democracy in the 1980s. Moreover, “the increase in the level of employment, added to the increase in the minimum wage, were the main factors in improving the living conditions” of many Brazilians and reducing social inequality. These achievements are not, however, entirely exempt from (due) criticism , since some actions "increased consumption power, without looking at other urban tensions of contemporary Brazil" that also need to be addressed.
However, those acts were not seen as the low point of the democratic decline of the Brazilian State, since in 2018, the change of political position was further confirmed with the election of President Jair Bolsonaro. His political project, clearly identified with the extreme right, and his constant practice of reacting with jokes, lack of decorum and verbal aggression — even in situations of extreme seriousness or major crisis — has prompted strong pushback from the population, and has led both national and international organizations to criticize, and demand a change in his behavior. However, such measures have had no effect on the President.
Even worse, the cumulative impact of the changes made prior to Bolsonaro’s rise and the current Brazilian governmental policy in the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic has been cause for Brazil to be criticized worldwide, with the sitting President being denounced as the worst ruler in terms of response. In addition to the many occasions in which he called COVID-19 a “little flu”, advised against isolation and social distancing in order to contain the virus, recommended evidently ineffective medications against the disease without any scientific proof, minimized the death toll in the country, and instituted numerous changes in the command of the Ministry of Health in a short time (and during the pandemic!), there is ample evidence of his inability to deal with the novel coronavirus.
It should be noted that Brazil was aware of the pandemic and had time to prepare for its arrival. However, the lack of communication, transparency and coordination between the Federal Government, states, and municipalities with regard to how the scarce resources for health should be allocated, and which unit of the federation would be responsible for which contingency actions aggravated the impact of COVID-19 in the country.
The latest episode of this de-concentration of actions due to the inability of the Federal Government to duly point to the measures that should be taken or promoted in order to battle COVID-19 concerns the vaccines that are being developed worldwide: because of the ideological paradigm applied to the current foreign policy, Bolsonaro defends that the only vaccines that should be made available to the Brazilian population is the one produced by AstraZeneca/Oxford, excluding others even though they might be (scientifically proven) safe and effective, especially CoronaVac – not only because it is made in China by Sinovac, but also because it partnered with the Butantan Institute, which is a São Paulo-based lab maintained by the state whose governor, João Dória, is Bolsonaro’s political rival.
And the consequences of the measures adopted have been more immediate upon the most vulnerable who, in Brazil, are known to be distinguished by colour (mainly the afro-Brazilian) and address (who live in the favelas) and income (the poor). These are the people who are unable to stay in their homes in order to avoid contamination and who depend upon the SUS for medical treatment – a system that is at the limits of its operational capacity. Furthermore, unlike most countries in the world which faced a first wave of the disease and soon managed to reduce contagion, COVID-19 has maintained an upward curve of contagions since its arrival in Brazil and gives no indication of an impending decrease. Meanwhile, the Federal Government seems uninterested in addressing this vulnerable swathe of the population. The measures taken were mainly directed to “save the economy, instead of saving lives”, as the President himself has affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, the consequences of political positioning on the measures adopted to confront the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil are a clear demonstration of the democratic decay Brazil has been facing for some time. And there are still more problems related to the pandemic and the CA to come. After all, with the "war budget" approved by the Brazilian Congress, Brazil is (legally) not respecting its budgetary limits. It is unlikely that the CA will be extended in 2021. And, with its end, more problems are envisioned since the pandemic, which, most probably, will not yet have come to an end, and the State will have limited funds to deploy in very sensitive areas hard hit by the pandemic, which will include education and social programs, in addition to health. If there were room for political debate (as is to be expected in a democracy), perhaps some positive prospective developments could be imagined, but this is not the case.
As a result, through this study, we can confirm the hypothesis that the limitations imposed by the aforementioned CA exacerbated inequalities in the country, and it has made it easier for the federal government to direct funds to areas that it considers to be a priority, which are not necessarily related to the reduction of social issues, as previously seen in the country. With this greater “directionism” of public funds to other areas, added to the entry of Bolsonaro in the Planalto Palace and COVID-19, reversing any problems prove to be even more difficult. And the de-concentration of political acts thus become a reality, attesting at the end the breakdown of Brazilian democracy.
Tatiana Cardoso Squeff holds a PhD in International Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). LLM in Public Law from Vale do Rio dos Sinos University (Unisinos). She is a Visiting researcher at the University of Ottawa and the University of Toronto. She currently holds a tenure-track position as professor of International Law at the the Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU). ORCID: 0000-0001-9912-9047.
Lucia Souza d’Aquino holds a PhD and LLM in Consumer Law from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). She is a Specialist in Comparative Law and European Contract Law and Consumer Law at Université de Savioe-Mont Blanc/UFRGS. Invited Professor at the Specialization Course “The New Consumer Law” at UFRGS. Substitute Professor at the Federal University of Grande Dourados (UFGD). ORCID: 0000-0002-0838-3566.