WEBINAR 6: EUROPE (OVERVIEW) - Snap Elections in Illiberal Regimes: Confirming Trust or Establishing Hegemony?
Dorjana BOJANOVSKA POPOVSKA
20 November 2020
While in Hungary and Poland the road towards illiberal democracy was paved with constitutional change, the case of North Macedonia shows us that unfortunately, there are other ways less detectable, yet equally successful in “achieving” similar results, one of which I claim are snap elections.
Snap elections are a litmus test revealing the peoples’ trust in government. At the right time, they are a tool for elevating majorities and/or perpetuating power. In illiberal regimes, unlike in democracies, electoral outcome is often not uncertain, or at least the level of uncertainty is significantly reduced. The right time is when there is not only expected but, (to a certain extent) pre-determined electoral victory– whether through electoral schemes like in Hungary, or by (ab)using parliamentary dissolution power as in North Macedonia.
Between 2006 and 2016 North Macedonia slid into a hybrid regime, a period coinciding with the rule of coalitions led by the center-right, populist VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) party. In this period, five general elections were held. I argue that in addition to confirming trust following political failures and/or as a remedy to a nonfunctioning parliament, the snap elections had several additional purposes: 1) to reinforce the populist notion of electoral legitimacy as a basis for a narrative justifying violation of constitutional restraints; and 2) to perpetuate power, aiming to rearrange the composition of state institutions. Thereafter, I will elaborate on some of the means employed to ensure electoral victory and briefly assess the continuing practice of snap elections post-2016.
Constitutional framework
The role of snap elections as a tool to perpetuate power must be understood within the Macedonian institutional setting - partly related to the specificities of parliamentary models per se and specifically the particular loose constitutional arrangement regarding dissolution power.
The weakness of parliamentary regimes under stress. North Macedonia has a parliamentary model of governance. The Assembly is composed of Representatives elected every 4 years through free and general elections. The leader of the coalition/political party that wins majority of seats in the Assembly receives a mandate from the President to form a Government. In practice, the Prime Minister is the president of the party who has won the majority, or the largest party within a coalition.
Unlike in presidential and mixed systems where term limits are set to curtail power, in parliamentary regimes there are no institutional solutions limiting the terms of prime ministers – if a party repeatedly wins elections, one prime minister can hold office in perpetuity. Landau has recently argued that this aspect of the constitutional design has proved problematic and under stress from illiberal, populist governments, personalist in nature.
Absolute dissolution power. Article 63 of the Constitution allows the Assembly to vote on its dissolution and therefore for snap elections to be called. The Assembly enjoys absolute discretion – the article does not determine the circumstances in which snap elections can be proposed, nor specific time-limits. Thus, in regards to dissolution power, the Macedonian institutional structure is as “parliamentary” as the Westminster model was until the Fixed Terms Parliament Act 2011; positioning the Assembly as a central body in the constitutional system, as it does not give the government (executive) the power to dissolve the Assembly but, it gives the Assembly the power to take a vote of no-confidence in the Government (Article 93).
The role of snap elections
The role of dissolution power is to confirm peoples’ trust in the government (e.g. in the aftermath or in anticipation of, decisions or events of historic importance) or to save the country from a weak or nonfunctioning government or parliament (with weak, unstable majorities resulting in ineffectiveness of the legislative process). Certainly, in the case of N. Macedonia such factors were employed as justifications for calling snap elections (e.g. weak governing coalitions, failures and mishaps on the road towards the country’s Euro-Atlantic membership (2008), a boycotted Assembly (2011)). I nevertheless argue that we should consider that snap elections in illiberal regimes can have other additional functions.
Narratives. Much has been written about the relationship between populism and illiberal regimes, and populist government’s intimate and distorted relationship with elections. Elections in illiberal regimes do not produce results from healthy political competition; rather, they serve the purpose of confirming results or majorities; as the will of the majority is operationalized as a justification for actions against the rule of law and other values of the liberal state. As such the illiberal state is democratic (at least in narrow sense - there are multiple parties and elections) but, it lacks constitutionalism. This corresponds to the Macedonian context.
In the narratives of VMRO-DPMNE (especially in those of Nikola Gruevski who served as a leader of the party and as Prime Minister) the role of ‘the people’(equivalent to the electoral majority) is grand: they are “the final instance that makes any form of moral, legal or political judgment… an arbiter in a legal dispute”; they decide if accusations made by the opposition regarding constitutional violations are true, if criticism by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community regarding the state of democracy has any merit, and if corruption exists. It is not the task of impartial institutions to investigate corruption, nor is it for the courts to judge – as all these functions are performed by ’the people’. How do ‘the people’ fulfil this grand role? By casting their vote. Thus, the task of elections is not only to confirm results, but also to legitimize otherwise unconstitutional or/and unlawful actions.
What snap elections add to the mix is reinforcement of plebiscitarian support. Snap elections allow for the confirmation of the majority will within smaller intervals and thus, they reinforce the notion of justification for unrestrained state action.
Elevating majorities and the gift of time...in office. Snap elections at the right time can be used as a tool to achieve three goals: 1) elevating majorities to the extent of gaining constitutional amendment/replacement power; 2) settling internal conflicts within the ruling party; and 3) perpetuating power by the gift of time in office. The Macedonian context in the period between 2006 and 2016 can serve as an example of the third.
When a party has the parliamentary majority necessary for constitutional amendment or replacement it may consolidate power by dismantling institutions in place to check it. Indeed, packing government institutions and courts is commonly achieved through constitutional changes that reorganize the composition and the manner in which these institutions function (e.g. Hungary and Poland). However, in parliamentary systems (and depending on the constitution) if a party remains in power or sustains a parliamentary majority long enough, it can consolidate power by changing the officials holding positions in existing government institutions and the judiciary in accordance with existing constitutional procedures. This is less problematic in so-called consolidated democracies where media is free, institutions function transparently and mechanisms of accountability are implemented. The story is quite different where the goal of a regime is to undermine constitutional restraints, perform state capture and is in control of the administrative state resources and the media.
Between 2006 and 2016 five general elections were held in North Macedonia, four of which were snap elections (in 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2016). With the exception of 2016, coalitions led by the incumbent VMRO-DPMNE won the elections and formed a government with the largest ethnic-Albanian party DUI (Democratic Union for Integration). Every two years, de jure and de facto, the coalitions led by VMRO-DPMNE won 4 more years in power (in two instances by larger majority) amounting to 10 consecutive years in power. The length of the rule and the fact that in the periods between 2008-2011 and 2014-2016 the coalition had an absolute majority (61 seats) allowed the government to pack institutions by previously established constitutional procedures.
Let’s take the Constitutional Court for example. The Court has 9 members, elected by the Assembly with absolute majority for a single 9-year term (constructed as to surpass one or two parliamentary (government) terms). According to the Constitution, two members are proposed by the President, two by the Judicial Council, for the rest the constitution is silent. As a result, a practice has developed that allows for the other five judges to be proposed by the Assembly- the same body that elects them. This by itself is problematic, especially considering that the ruling party or coalition almost always has an absolute majority. That was certainly the case with VMRO-DPMNE and DUI from 2008. During their 10-year rule, the parliamentary majority led by VMRO-DPMNE elected a total number of seven Constitutional Court judges.
Another example is “institutionalized” patronage. Between 2006 and 2016 the number of public employees increased threefold from 60,000 to 180,000. According to surveys, only 7% of government employees believe that their recruitment is done based on merit. Instead, “political affinity, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, and bribes became the major recruiting factors on the part of the administration.” This served two purposes – establishing complete control of state institutions (blurring of the line between state and party) and, as I will further argue, insuring electoral outcomes.
Tools: securing electoral victory
Media capture. North Macedonia is another example of media capture. Cases of journalists being imprisoned and threatened, and the closing of one of the biggest TV stations (considered as pro-opposition) evidence this. On the other hand, government funding through “state advertising funds” contributed to “favorable” editorial policies form media outlets whose existence depended on such advertising revenue. Additionally, in 2013 two new laws were adopted in a rather opaque procedure, the Law on Media and the Law on Audiovisual Services imposing over-regulation and thus, restricting editorial freedom.
Government employment and intimidation. How to ensure electoral victory? By using the public sector as a “political instrument.” North Macedonia suffers high levels of unemployment, especially among young people, thus, government employment is considered “a success” due to its presumed stability. In 2013, 48% of the enrolled university students expressed their preference towards government employment after graduation. As mentioned, government employment was used as a tool to reward party loyalists, thus, was based on loyalty and rather than merit. As a result, government employees feared termination of employment in the event of change of government; making their livelihood dependent of the sustainability of the party in power. This produces indirect pressure on public employees in an individual capacity as voters but, also in the capacity of voter recruits (by personal motivation). However, both reports and the tapes from the 2015 wiretapping scandal have shown practices of direct forms of voter intimidation and control enforced among public employees – both in an individual capacity (direct pressure to vote for a certain party) and voter recruitment (by being tasked to recruit voters for the party providing exact lists with names) under the threat of being fired.
Just to be sure: electoral irregularities. The Electoral Law has been amended according to ODIHR recommendations and overall elections were found to be efficiently administered. However, both reports and the tapes revealed electoral irregularities including extortion, manipulation of voter lists; voter buying; voter intimidation, including threats against civil servants, and prevention of voters from casting votes. This further goes to show that in illiberal regimes well-drafted laws and fulfillment of formal requirements don’t necessarily guarantee truly free elections.
Post-2016
In December 2016 snap elections were held in the midst of major political crises following a large scale wiretapping scandal that resulted in massive, long-lasting protests. After the election, despite winning 2 seats less than VMRO-DPMNE, the largest opposition party SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) formed a majority and government with three ethnic-Albanian parties including DUI. In its 2.5 year mandate the government signed the historic Prespa Agreement with Greece, ending the decades-long dispute regarding the name of the state. The agreement ignited fierce public opposition in both countries. In North Macedonia the name change was presented as a tough pill that, if swallowed, would open the doors to Euro-Atlantic partnerships.
When the country did not manage to obtain a date for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU, the Prime Minister called for snap-elections, asking for a more stable (larger) majority that will help him fulfill the obligations leading to Euro-Atlantic membership. The Assembly dissolved itself in February and snap-elections were scheduled for the 12th of April. The call for snap-elections followed the same pattern, aimed to confirm trust after factual political failure and consolidate the legitimacy of the party but, also clearly aimed at elevating majorities. The escalation of the COVID-19 crisis inevitably resulted in postponement of the elections for mid-July. SDSM won 2 more seats than VMRO-DPMNE and formed a government with DUI, vowing to keep the country on its Euro-Atlantic path (after the country already joined NATO that March and obtained a date for accession talks with the EU that June).
It is yet to be seen if the Macedonian Assembly will serve its four-year parliamentary mandate after 12 years of turbulent rearrangement of majorities, the result of snap elections granting the gift of time which allowed for the transformation of the institutional landscape of the country (aimed at advancing particular party and individual interest). It is also yet to be seen if future governments will be able to escape the ghost of the past, or if they will utilize the leftover structures at their disposal.
Dorjana Bojanovska Popovska is an S.J.D Candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law at the Central European University. Her professional memberships include the European Academy of Religion, International Society of Constitutional Law (ICON S) and the ICON S CEE Chapter. She is a permanent member and contributor to the Gender and Constitutions Research Group part of the International Association of Constitutional Law. She has 5+ years of professional experience as a legal advisor in the private and NGO sector in North Macedonia.